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Investigating Traffic Analysis Attacks on Apple iCloud Private Relay

Published:10 July 2023Publication History

ABSTRACT

The iCloud Private Relay (PR) is a new feature introduced by Apple in June 2021 that aims to enhance online privacy by protecting a subset of web traffic from both local eavesdroppers and websites that use IP-based tracking. The service is integrated into Apple’s latest operating systems and uses a two-hop architecture where a user’s web traffic is relayed through two proxies run by disjoint entities.

PR’s multi-hop architecture resembles traditional anonymity systems such as Tor and mix networks. Such systems, however, are known to be susceptible to a vulnerability known as traffic analysis: an intercepting adversary (e.g., a malicious router) can attempt to compromise the privacy promises of such systems by analyzing characteristics (e.g., packet timings and sizes) of their network traffic. In particular, previous works have widely studied the susceptibility of Tor to website fingerprinting and flow correlation, two major forms of traffic analysis.

In this work, we are the first to investigate the threat of traffic analysis against the recently introduced PR. First, we explore PR’s current architecture to establish a comprehensive threat model of traffic analysis attacks against PR. Second, we quantify the potential likelihood of these attacks against PR by evaluating the risks imposed by real-world AS-level adversaries through empirical measurement of Internet routes. Our evaluations show that some autonomous systems are in a particularly strong position to perform traffic analysis on a large fraction of PR traffic. Finally, having demonstrated the potential for these attacks to occur, we evaluate the performance of several flow correlation and website fingerprinting attacks over PR traffic. Our evaluations show that PR is highly vulnerable to state-of-the-art website fingerprinting and flow correlation attacks, with both attacks achieving high success rates. We hope that our study will shed light on the significance of traffic analysis to the current PR deployment, convincing Apple to perform design adjustments to alleviate the risks.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      ASIA CCS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
      July 2023
      1066 pages
      ISBN:9798400700989
      DOI:10.1145/3579856

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      • Published: 10 July 2023

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