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Fair Secure Computation with Reputation Assumptions in the Mobile Social Networks

Yilei Wang, Chuan Zhao, Qiuliang Xu, Zhihua Zheng, Zhenhua Chen, Zhe Liu
2015 Mobile Information Systems  
Here we regard the applications in mobile social networks as specific functions and stress on the achievement of fairness on these functions within mobile social networks in the presence of two rational  ...  Rational parties value their utilities when they participate in secure computation protocol in mobile social networks.  ...  Disclosure An abstract of this paper has been presented in the INCOS2013 conference, pages 309-314, 2013 [35] .  ... 
doi:10.1155/2015/637458 fatcat:s7ptrf42j5fnljoy4ki3kogjhm

Agent Reasoning in Negotiation [chapter]

Katia Sycara, Tinglong Dai
2010 Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation  
information seeking, and cognitive factors) and engage in negotiations in a decentralized manner.  ...  Such agent models promise to contribute to our understanding of human information processing in negotiation. Additionally, they could be used for decision support of human decision makers.  ...  Acknowledgements The current research has been supported by the ARO Multi University Research Initiative grant W911-NF-0810301.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9097-3_26 fatcat:y2ulmzex55c3vhcaw6ojwikzwa

Bayesian mechanism for rational secret sharing scheme

YouLiang Tian, ChangGen Peng, DongDai Lin, JianFeng Ma, Qi Jiang, WenJiang Ji
2015 Science China Information Sciences  
We consider the cooperation of rational parties in secret sharing. We present a new methodology for rational secret sharing both in two-party and multi-party settings based on Bayesian game.  ...  Our protocol is adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to beliefs and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels and can be run over asynchronous networks.  ...  is a sequential equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11432-014-5275-5 fatcat:vosfgnxgpvbapacrbtoge6zuq4

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COMPUTER-BASED NEGOTIATION IN PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

Datuk Ary Adriansyah Samsura, Adrian van Deemen, Erwin van der Krabben, Rob van der Heijden
2014 International Journal of Strategic Property Management  
This study also provides evidences that it is in the negotiators' concern to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, which is defined here as the equilibrium, regardless the availability of the information  ...  We have also extended the experiment into three different negotiation games distinguished by the availability of information to the participants: a negotiation game with incomplete information, asymmetric  ...  Suppose there are only two parties (A and B) engaged in the exchange of two valued resources, for instance x that is provided by A and y that is provided by B.  ... 
doi:10.3846/1648715x.2014.970597 fatcat:qqokpc6fznhwtpxe66a35rlspu

Game theory meets network security and privacy

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Quanyan Zhu, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Bacşar, Jean-Pierre Hubaux
2013 ACM Computing Surveys  
This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the research contributions that analyze and solve security and privacy problems in computer networks by game-theoretic approaches.  ...  In each category, security problems, players, and game models are identified and the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs are summarized.  ...  In such computations, game theory can help parties perform certain protocols. MPC also can help parties in the game to achieve a certain equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 fatcat:55ixmohvijaelflxqrrbtnvfuu

SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies [article]

Sarah Azouvi, Alexander Hicks
2020 arXiv   pre-print
This gives an overview of the available tools, and we look at their (potential) use in practice, in the context of existing blockchain based systems that have been proposed or implemented.  ...  Cryptocurrencies have garnered much attention in recent years, both from the academic community and industry.  ...  The game is parametrized by a multi-party functionality F and consists of two sequential moves.  ... 
arXiv:1905.08595v2 fatcat:qmg2qtn3avf4jlqaorbnix3t4e

Pretrial negotiation, litigation, and procedural rules

J Gong
2000 Economic Inquiry  
We model the ci¨il dispute resolution process as a two-stage game with the parties bargaining to reach a settlement in the first stage and then playing a litigation expenditure game at trial in the second  ...  O¨erall welfare changes are in fa¨or of the party who makes the offer in the pretrial negotiation stage.  ...  It is straightforward to compute the expected equilibrium outcome for the two parties under different signal configurations when ␣ is close to or equal to 0. 17 These values are presented in Table I .  ... 
doi:10.1093/ei/38.2.218 fatcat:lpxxg6jq2rdjpf624njn23ufem

Pretrial negotiation, litigation, and procedural rules

J Gong, RP McAfee
2000 Economic Inquiry  
We model the ci¨il dispute resolution process as a two-stage game with the parties bargaining to reach a settlement in the first stage and then playing a litigation expenditure game at trial in the second  ...  O¨erall welfare changes are in fa¨or of the party who makes the offer in the pretrial negotiation stage.  ...  It is straightforward to compute the expected equilibrium outcome for the two parties under different signal configurations when ␣ is close to or equal to 0. 17 These values are presented in Table I .  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00015.x fatcat:cgadkiqujzac3i5jybv56mvppe

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori, Alessandra Sgobbi
2005 Social Science Research Network  
By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same  ...  How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances?  ...  In other words, incompleteness in information can cause inefficient equilibrium outcomes.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.722363 fatcat:rehz72ye4rdajolvlrpgtcrnwe

RatFish: A File Sharing Protocol Provably Secure against Rational Users [chapter]

Michael Backes, Oana Ciobotaru, Anton Krohmer
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We design a novel file sharing protocol called RatFish, and we formally prove that no rational party has an incentive to deviate from RatFish; i.e., RatFish constitutes a Nash equilibrium.  ...  The proliferation of P2P computing has recently been propelled by popular applications, most notably file sharing protocols such as BitTorrent.  ...  To ensure fair exchanges, leechers first exchange the pieces in encrypted form and subsequently send the corresponding decryption keys. How an Equilibrium is Achieved.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_37 fatcat:adyhledtsveyzmmedqj3vc4rt4

FileBounty: Fair Data Exchange [article]

Simon Janin, Kaihua Qin, Akaki Mamageishvili, Arthur Gervais
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Our novel deposit refunding scheme is resistant to extortion attacks under rational adversaries.  ...  perfect Nash equilibrium.  ...  We show that honest behavior in FileBounty is a Nash equilibrium under a rational adversary.  ... 
arXiv:2008.11362v2 fatcat:ko6a6bwfbjfahcysrnycmif55y

Generic Superlight Client for Permissionless Blockchains [article]

Yuan Lu, Qiang Tang, Guiling Wang
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Under such a game-theoretic model, we design a superlight-client protocol to enable a client to employ some relaying full nodes (e.g. two or one) to read the blockchain.  ...  We conduct a systematic study on the light client of permissionless blockchains, in the setting where the full nodes and the light clients are rational.  ...  1 Writing in the blockchain is trivial, as one can gossip with some full nodes to diffuse its messages to the entire blockchain network (a.k.a., network diffuse functionality [30, 7] ).  ... 
arXiv:2003.06552v2 fatcat:hkq3qabso5goxdxmqerg3rtjve

Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited

A. Kalai, E. Kalai
2012 Quarterly Journal of Economics  
information.  ...  For two-person strategic games with transferable utility, all major variablethreat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide.  ...  21 It is necessary to specify how to act under such zero-probability events in order to argue, as we do below, that we have a sequential equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.1093/qje/qjs074 fatcat:7pj4diac7za7pmw2h6uwydtafu

A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning [article]

Rongfei Zeng, Chao Zeng, Xingwei Wang, Bo Li, Xiaowen Chu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
By reviewing and comparing some impressive results, we figure out three directions for the future study.  ...  In such promising paradigm, the performance will be deteriorated without sufficient training data and other resources in the learning process.  ...  and incomplete information?  ... 
arXiv:2106.15406v1 fatcat:7v7adaw5wnbldhykma6mhgpnty

The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation

Avery Katz
1990 Michigan law review  
models can also differ depending upon whether the incomplete information is taken to be one-sided (only one party has information that the other does not) or two-sided (each party has some information  ...  If one specifies the informational structure carefully, however, and if one assumes that parties understand the extent to which their information is incomplete, sequential equilibria for these games can  ...  This dependence is shown in Figure 3 by two lines. The common law rule is represented by the broken and kinked line marked "Regime I."  ... 
doi:10.2307/1289373 fatcat:jcoea4y4ynfxdmirfzkuklzef4
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