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Secure Information Flow Verification with Mutable Dependent Types

Published:18 June 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a novel secure hardware description language (HDL) that uses an information flow type system to ensure that hardware is secure at design time. The novelty of this HDL lies in its ability to securely share hardware modules and storage elements across multiple security levels. Unlike previous secure HDLs, the new HDL enables secure sharing at a fine granularity and without implicitly adding hardware for security enforcement; this is important because the implicitly added hardware can break functionality and harm efficiency. The new HDL enables practical hardware designs that are secure, correct, and efficient. We demonstrate the practicality of the new HDL by using it to design and type-check a synthesizable pipelined processor implementation that support protection rings and instructions that change modes.

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  1. Secure Information Flow Verification with Mutable Dependent Types

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      DAC '17: Proceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation Conference 2017
      June 2017
      533 pages
      ISBN:9781450349277
      DOI:10.1145/3061639

      Copyright © 2017 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 18 June 2017

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