Abstract
Hardware Trojans have emerged as a new threat to the security and trust of computing systems. Hardware Trojans are deliberate and malicious modifications to the logic function implemented within digital and mixed signal chips. In contrast to software Trojans, it is not possible to simply "scan the hard drive" to eradicate a hardware Trojan. Hardware Trojans can be designed to shutdown the chip at some predetermined time and/or when some specific signal or data pattern is received. They may also be designed to remain hidden while leaking confidential information covertly to the adversary. Determining whether a hardware Trojan has been inserted into a chip is extremely difficult for a variety of reasons, e.g., nanometer feature sizes and chip design complexity combine to make optical inspection difficult or impossible. This paper presents experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of a Trojan detection method that is based on the analysis of a chip's IDDQs (steady-state current), which are measured simultaneously from multiple places on the chip. The proposed method also incorporates a technique for virtually eliminating process and test environment variations effects which act to reduce detection sensitivity of traditional testing approaches. Used together, resolution enhancements of up to a 1000× are possible over conventional single power supply current measurement techniques. A regression-based statistical technique is applied to the data collected from a set of chips fabricated in a 65-nm process to illustrate the detection capabilities and limitations of this type of approach.
- Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply Feb. 2005 {Online}. Available: http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/ images/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdfGoogle Scholar
- Trust In Integrated Circuits (TIC) Microsystems Technology Office (website) {Online}. Available: http://www.darpa.mil/mto/solicitations/ baa07-24/index.htmlGoogle Scholar
- D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, and B. Sunar, "Trojan detection using IC fingerprinting," in Proc. Symp. Security and Privacy, 2007, pp. 296-310. Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. Rad, J. Plusquellic, and M. Tehranipoor, "Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power supply transient signals," in Proc. Int. Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 3-7. Google ScholarDigital Library
- F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, S. Bhunia, and R. Chakraborty, "Towards Trojan-free trusted ICs: Problem analysis and detection scheme," Des., Autom. Test Eur., pp. 1362-1365, 2008. Google ScholarDigital Library
- J. Li and J. Lach, "At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan horse detection," in Proc. Int. Workshop Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 8-14. Google ScholarDigital Library
- M. Banga and M. S. Hsiao, "A region based approach for the identification of hardware Trojans," in Proc. Int. Workshop Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 40-47. Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. S. Chakraborty, S. Paul, and S. Bhunia, "On-demand transparency for improving hardware Trojan detectability," in Proc. Int. Workshop Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 48-50. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Y. Jin and Y. Makris, "Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprints," in Proc. Int. Workshop Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 51-57. Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Acharyya and J. Plusquellic, "Hardware results demonstrating defect detection using power supply signal measurements," in Proc. VLSI Test Symp., 2005, pp. 433-438. Google ScholarDigital Library
- J. Plusquellic, D. Acharyya, A. Singh, M. Tehranipoor, and C. Patel, "Quiescent signal analysis: A multiple supply pad IDDQ method," IEEE Des. Test Comput., vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 278-293, Apr. 2006. Google ScholarDigital Library
- X. Wang, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, "Detecting malicious inclusions in secure hardware: Challenges and solutions," in Proc. Int. Workshop Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008, pp. 15-19. Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Acharyya and J. Plusquellic, "Calibrating power supply signal measurements for process and probe card variations," in Proc. IEEE Int. Workshop Current and Defect Based Testing, 2004, pp. 23-30. Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. M. Rad, X. Wang, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, "Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans," in Proc. IEEE/ACM Int. Conf. Computer-Aided Design, 2008, pp. 632-639. Google ScholarDigital Library
Recommendations
A sensitivity analysis of power signal methods for detecting hardware Trojans under real process and environmental conditions
Trust in reference to integrated circuits addresses the concern that the design and/or fabrication of the integrated circuit (IC) may be purposely altered by an adversary. The insertion of a hardware Trojan involves a deliberate and malicious change to ...
Detecting Hardware Trojans using On-chip Sensors in an ASIC Design
The modern integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing process has exposed the fabless semiconductor industry to hardware Trojans that threaten circuits bound for critical applications. This paper investigates an on-chip sensor's effectiveness for Trojan ...
High Resolution Pulse Propagation Driven Trojan Detection in Digital Systems
AbstractOutsourcing of IC manufacturing has opened the possibility of intentionally modifying the operation of the IC in a subtle way so that it is extremely difficult to detect, in conventional functional testing. Security in computation is no longer a ...
Comments