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Coalescence Principle

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Abstract

Notations Throughout this chapter we use the same notations as above (see Sect. 2.1). Recall that, during an attack, we consider that the adversary targets the manipulation of a single sensitive variable Z, such that \(Z=F(X,k)\). Typically \(Z=sbox(X\oplus k)\), such that \(s-box\) denotes a substitution box and \(\oplus \) denotes the bitwise addition. The attack is carried out with N traces \(\vec {l}_0\), ..., \(\vec {l}_{N-1}\). Each \(\vec {l_i}\hookleftarrow \vec {L}\) corresponds to the processing of \(z_i=F(x_i,k)\). The number of samples per traces (instantaneous leakage points) is denoted by D.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This assumption is reasonable when the code or the hardware is reused; this occurs in practice for the sake of cost overhead mitigation.

  2. 2.

    Note that we employ the notation \({{\,\mathrm{argmin}\,}}_{k^{(\cdot )}} \min _\phi \), which suggests that, first of all, a minimization on \(\phi \) is performed for a set of vectorial keys \(k^{(\cdot )}\), and then that the minimal value for all \(k^{(\cdot )}\) is sought, and the corresponding key set is returned. But actually, the minimization is not forced to be in this order, as \(k^{(\cdot )}\in (\mathbb {F}_2^n)^W\) and \(\phi :\mathbb {F}_2^n\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) are independent variables.

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Correspondence to Maamar Ouladj .

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Ouladj, M., Guilley, S. (2021). Coalescence Principle. In: Side-Channel Analysis of Embedded Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77222-2_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77222-2_7

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