

# Differential Privacy Preserving Genomic Data Releasing via Factor Graph

Zaobo He<sup>1</sup>, Yingshu Li<sup>1</sup>, and Jinbao Wang<sup>2</sup>


<sup>1</sup>Georgia State University, USA

<sup>2</sup>Harbin Institute of Technology, China

# Background

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- Cost of DNA sequencing drops dramatically
  - Genomic study requires analyzing large amount of genetic information from many individuals.
  - Individuals are using their genomes to learn about disease predispositions, medicines, etc.
  - Voluntary and mandated sharing of genome data among hospitals, biomedical research organizations, and other data holders.



# Background (Cont.)

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- Kin-Genomic Privacy
  - DNA sequences of relatives are even highly similar
  - No consent from one's relatives is needed to release ones genome data
  - Individuals revealing genome data may threaten the relatives' privacy besides their own.

# Studied Problem

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- Differential privacy guaranteed kin-genomic data releasing

# Previous Privacy Preserving Methods

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- Signal-to-noise ratio
  - ▣ Large scale of noise is required for high-dimensional genomic data
  - ▣ Degrade the utility of released data

# Our Method

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- Key idea: degrade genomic data sensitivity
  - ▣ Less noise is required to be injected
- Factorize the high-dimensional distribution of the original genomic data with a set of low-dimensional distributions
  - ▣ For low-dimensional distributions, signal-to-noise problem avoided
  - ▣ A sufficiently accurate approximation
- Data correlations
  - ▣ SNP-trait association
  - ▣ Mendelian Inheritance Probabilities

# Genome-Wide Association Studies

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- Objective of GWAS:
  - Analyze genomic data to find statistical correlations between SNPs and trait (e.g., disease)
  - Compare the genomes of patients with trait and the genomes of patients without trait (e.g., disease)

Case group:  
with disease



AACTGTCCG



ACCTGTACG

Control group:  
without disease



AATTGTACA



AATTGTCCA

# Mendelian Inheritance Probabilities

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- A child inherits one allele from mother and one from father.
- Each allele of a parent is inherited by a child with equal probability of 0.5.
- SNP position: BB, Bb, or bb.


Table 1: The probability distribution of Child's genotype, given different probability distribution of its parents genotypes.

Child \ Mother	BB	Bb	bb
Father			
BB	(1, 0, 0)	(1/2, 1/2, 0)	(0, 1, 0)
Bb	(1/2, 1/2, 0)	(1/4, 1/2, 1/4)	(0, 1/2, 1/2)
bb	(0, 1, 0)	(0, 1/2, 1/2)	(0, 0, 1)




# Differential Privacy [DMNS, TCC 06]

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# Differential Privacy

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
$D$  and  $D'$  are **neighbors** if they differ on at most one record

A randomized algorithm  $A$  satisfies  $\epsilon$ -differential privacy, if for any two neighbours  $D$  and  $D'$ , and for any possible output  $O$  of  $A$ , we have:

$$\Pr[A(D)=O] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[A(D')=O]$$

# Laplace Mechanism

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
$$\Delta f = \max_{D, D'} \|f(D) - f(D')\|_1$$

For a counting query  $f$ :  $\Delta f = 1$

- E.g., for counting query  $Q$  over dataset  $D$ , returning  $Q(D) + \text{Laplace}(1 / \epsilon)$  maintains  $\epsilon$ -differential privacy.

# Our Method: High-Level Overview

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JCD: Joint Conditional Distribution

$X_U$ : sensitive variables

$X_K$ : non-sensitive variables

F: Mendelian inheritance probabilities

A: SNP-trait associations

# Two Challenges

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- Computation of JCD is non-trivial, considering the scale of human genomes
  - ▣ Tens of millions of SNPs
  - ▣ Large scale of potential traits
- Inject differential privacy noise into genomic data (including SNPs and traits) to derive a close approximation
  - ▣ Data privacy: poor scalability; expensive
  - ▣ Data utility: high sensitivity


# Solutions

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- Factorize the high-dimensional JCD into the product of simpler local functions
  - ▣ Capturing data correlations (SNP-trait associations; Mendelian inheritance probabilities)
- Inject differential privacy noise into these local functions
  - ▣ Low-dimensional local functions incur low sensitivity

# Computation of JCD

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$$p(X_U | X_K, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}) = \frac{1}{Z} \prod_{i \in S} \prod_{j \in T} f_i(s_i^C, s_i^F, s_i^M, \mathcal{F}) g_{ij}(s_i, t_j, \mathcal{A})$$

Belief propagation in a factor graph obtains exponential gains in efficiency.

# Injection of Differential Privacy Noise

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$$p(X_U | X_K, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}) = \frac{1}{Z} \prod_{i \in S} \prod_{j \in T} f_i(s_i^C, s_i^F, s_i^M, \mathcal{F}) g_{ij}(s_i, t_j, \mathcal{A})$$

To construct approximate distribution  $p^*(X_U | X_K, F, A)$ .

$m$ : # individuals in the target family

$n$ : # SNPs

$r$ : # traits

$n$  items, each with sensitivity  $3/m$

$r$  items, each with sensitivity  $2/m$

+

+

scale of Laplace noise:  $6n/m\epsilon$

scale of Laplace noise:  $4r/m\epsilon$



each item satisfy  $\epsilon/2n$  DP

each item satisfy  $\epsilon/2r$  DP

$\epsilon/2$ -DP

$\epsilon/2$ -DP

**Compensability property:**  
 $\epsilon$ -DP is satisfied!



# Conclusions

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- Differential-privacy preserving kin-genomic data releasing
- Key ideas of the solution
  - Belief propagation in a factor graph for dimension reduction
  - Differential privacy noise directly injected into low-dimensional local distributions



**THANK YOU!**

**Q&A**