IllusionPIN: Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Authentication Using Hybrid Images*

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ABSTRACT

We address the problem of shoulder-surfing attacks on authentication schemes by proposing IllusionPIN (IPIN), a PIN-based authentication method that operates on touch-screen devices. IPIN uses the technique of hybrid images to blend two keypads with different digit orderings in such a way, that the user who is close to the device is seeing one keypad to enter her PIN, while the attacker who is looking at the device from a bigger distance is seeing only the other keypad. The user's keypad is shuffled in every authentication attempt since the attacker may memorize the spatial arrangement of the pressed digits.

To reason about the security of IllusionPIN, we developed an algorithm which is based on human visual perception and estimates the minimum distance from which an observer is unable to interpret the keypad of the user. We tested our estimations with 84 simulated shoulder-surfing attacks from 21 different people. None of the attacks was successful against our estimations. In addition, we estimated the minimum distance from which a camera is unable to capture the visual information from the keypad of the user. Based on our analysis, it seems practically almost impossible for a surveil-lance camera to capture the PIN of a smartphone user when IPIN is in use.

1. INTRODUCTION

User authentication is performed in various ways [4]. We focus on PIN authentication because of its simplicity and maturity. A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is a sequence of digits that confirms the identity of a person when it is successfully presented. PINs are simpler than alphanumeric passwords as they solely consist of numerical characters (0-9) and have a short length that is usually either 4 or 6 digits. This makes PINs easy to remember and easy to reproduce, and as a consequence, PIN authentication is characterized by infrequent errors [10]. So, simplicity is translated to usability. The maturity of PIN authentication is a result of its continuous usage for years in a wide range of everyday life applications, like mobile phones and banking systems.

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From the perspective of security, PIN authentication is susceptible to brute force or even guessing attacks [5]. To balance this weakness, the number of allowed authentication attempts is usually constrained to a small number such as 5. However, a simple attack that is still very hard to mitigate is shoulder-surfing [1].

Shoulder-surfing refers to eavesdropping personal information, like an alphanumeric password or a PIN, through observation. A typical example is an adversary who is standing behind a person in the line for an ATM machine and is looking, or "surfing", over the person's shoulder to obtain her PIN information. In this scenario, the attacker is observing a person while being in her vicinity. However, the attacker may observe someone remotely by using recorded material that was collected intentionally or even unintentionally. For example, unintentional recording of shoulder-surfing material could result from a surveillance camera that captured a person while entering her authentication credentials to unlock her phone in a store or at the workplace.

Authentication schemes which are not resilient to observation are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing. Any kind of visual information may be observed, including the blink of a button when it is pressed, or even the oily residue that the fingers leave on a touchscreen [2]. Shoulder-surfing is a big threat for PIN authentication in particular, because it is relatively easy for an observer to follow the PIN authentication process. PINs are short and require just a small numeric keypad instead of the usual alphanumeric keyboard. In addition, PIN authentication is often performed in crowded places, e.g., when someone is unlocking her mobile phone on the street or in the subway. Shoulder-surfing is facilitated in such scenarios since it is easier for an attacker to stand close to the user while escaping her attention.

The motivation behind this work relies on the hypothesis that PIN authentication will really meet the needs of its users when it will increase its shoulder-surfing resistance without a significant overhead in its usability. We contributed towards this claim in the following ways.

• We designed IllusionPIN (IPIN) for touchscreen devices. The virtual keypad of IPIN is composed of two keypads with different digit orderings, blended in a single hybrid image [25]. The user who is close to the screen is able to see and use one keypad, but a poten-

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tial attacker who is looking at the screen from a bigger distance, is able to see only the other keypad. We analyze in detail the design of IllusionPIN in Section 5.

- We developed an algorithm to estimate whether or not the user's keypad is visible to an observer at a given viewing position. We explain the estimation algorithm in Section 6.
- We tested the estimated visibility of IllusionPIN through a user study of simulated shoulder-surfing attacks on smartphone devices. In total, we performed 84 attacks with 21 different people and none of the attacks was successful against our estimations. We provide the details of this user study in Section 8.
- We estimated the minimum distance from which a camera is unable to capture the visual information from the user's keypad. The exact procedure is explained in Section 7. The results show that it is practically almost impossible for a surveillance camera to capture the PIN of a smartphone user when Illusion-PIN is in use.

2. RELATED WORK

We organize shoulder-surfing resistant authentication schemes according to 6 design principles. The Obscurity principle states that the visual information of interest has to be obscured. For example, ShieldPIN [14] requires the user to physically cover the keypad by cupping one hand while using the other hand to enter her PIN. It is obvious that such an approach demands physical effort and simultaneous usage of both hands that may be unwanted. An alternative solution that does not require any extra effort from the user is to make the content of the screen visible within a limited range of viewing angle. This can be achieved either with additional hardware, e.g. privacy filters, or with special hardware, e.g. automultiscopic displays [6, 21]. In both cases, deployability may be an issue. However, there is a number of software solutions which create a similar effect [11, 15]. Specifically, depending on the viewing angle, different visual elements appear on the screen and obscure the real content. These approaches exploit technical limitations of certain screens' technology, and as a result, they can't be generalized or expected to be applicable in the future as screen technology advances. In addition, a shoulder-surfer is not necessarily observing from a big angle, as he may be just standing behind the user.

The Visual Complexity principle states that it has to be difficult to receive the visual information of interest [12]. For example, DAS [13] is a simple graphical password that allows the user to create a free-form drawing on a touch-screen and to use it as her password. Decoy Strokes [42] is a shoulder-surfing resistant variation of DAS that draws strokes alongside the user's password to confuse a malicious observer. The problem with such schemes is that the user is exposed to the same distracting information and may end up confused as well, leading to slower authentication and more frequent input errors. Also, if the attacker is able to observe multiple times during the authentication process or to record it, he may be able to steal the credentials of the user.

The Cognitive Complexity principle states that it has to be difficult to process the acquired visual information [38]. For example, in one of the cognitive trapdoor games [31], the user is required to enter her PIN in the following way. The digits on the provided keypad are separated into two sets based on their color; half of them are black, and half of them are white. The user selects the set that the current digit of her PIN belongs to, and then the digits are reassigned to the two color sets. This procedure is repeated until the scheme is able to uniquely determine the correct digit by intersecting the selected sets. Then, the user proceeds to the next digit of her PIN. For an observer, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to successfully perform sequential intersections of sets to extract the correct PIN. However, such schemes are usually complex for the users too, with all the inevitable consequences for usability. In addition, recorded material or even repeated observation may reveal the authentication credentials, since all the useful information is observable.

The **Alteration** principle states that the required input has to change in every authentication attempt [28, 41]. For example, Deja Vu [9] presents to the user a number n of images, and asks her to specify which of them belong to a predefined set of images, called the user's portfolio. In each authentication attempt, different images from the portfolio are assigned to the set of the n images. As a consequence, an observer cannot learn the portfolio of the user in a limited number of observations. However, multiple observations may reveal the whole portfolio. In general, with such schemes is difficult for the user to get familiar with a standard input. For example, with Deja Vu the user has to identify different pictures in every authentication attempt. This requires additional cognitive effort and may affect the authentication time and the error rate.

The **One-to-Many** principle states that the same input has to correspond to more than one authentication credentials [17, 40, 29, 8, 31, 37]. For example, SlotPIN [14] allows the user to enter a PIN by aligning four vertical reels of randomly ordered digits. The first reel is static and denotes the position of the first PIN digit. The other three reels get aligned by the user according to the PIN. In the end, ten PINs are formed, and a shoulder-surfer is unable to know which is the correct one. In addition, it is difficult to memorize all of them. However, the attacker could replicate the same input without the need to know the correct credentials. That's why schemes designed under this principle randomize the input interface periodically. In the case of SlotPIN, the digits on the reels are randomized in every authentication attempt. The problem with such schemes is that they exhibit high complexity in order to break the one-to-one correspondence between inputs and authentication credentials. This results in high cognitive effort on the user side and renders such schemes unacceptable for frequent usage, e.g. for unlocking mobile phones. Also, multiple observations may reveal the correct credentials.

The **Non-Visual Information** principle states that at least part of the information of interest has to be transmitted through channels that are not observable. This way, an observer is always missing a piece of information and shoulder-surfing is mitigated even in cases that multiple observations or recordings are possible. However, the performance of such schemes in usability and deployability varies. For example,

schemes which use audio and haptic information [3, 35] suffer from high authentication time and their requirements for additional hardware heavily affect their deployability. However, the emergence of touchscreen devices which are pressure-sensitive may favor schemes which use this kind of haptic information [19, 32, 22, 34, 33, 23], if they are combined with satisfying usability. Gaze-based authentication [16] corresponds to high authentication time, and authentication based on brainwaves [7] or bone conduction [36] requires special equipment. Fingerprint authentication [30] is a scheme that gains popularity nowadays by offering excellent usability. A usual problem with biometrics like fingerprints is that they cannot be revoked. In addition, biometrics can be used to uniquely identify a person and they raise privacy concerns. However, the concept of cancelable biometrics [27] could alleviate both problems.

3. THREAT MODEL

A threat model guides the design of a security scheme. Our threat model consists of shoulder-surfing attack scenarios against smartphone authentication. Different scenarios involve attacks with different difficulty to mitigate. The most difficult scenario that we consider corresponds to situations similar to a crowded train where we assume that a shouldersurfer may be as close as 25 inches to the user. The least dangerous scenario we consider corresponds to workplace conditions, where a shoulder-surfer has the ability to repeatedly observe the user but from a minimum distance of 60 inches (e.g. the shoulder-surfer works to the cubicle next to the user). A scenario with intermediate difficulty corresponds to a non-crowded public place, where a shoulder-surfer may approach the user in a radius of 35 or 45 inches. As we can see, in each scenario we have to protect the user for viewing distances which are equal or bigger than a particular distance. We call such a distance "safety distance", and we denote it with d_s . It is also important to consider that when the shoulder-surfer stands behind the user, it is difficult to have visual contact with the phone screen even if he is considerably taller than the user. Based on that, we assume that the shoulder-surfer is standing next to the user at an angle that is at least 30 degrees. We would like to note that the aforementioned safety distance values that ranged from 25 to 60 inches and corresponded to different scenarios, were determined empirically. Similarly, the value of 30 degrees is empirical too.

We additionally consider the scenario that the attacker has the ability to record the user during the authentication process. It is difficult for an attacker to record a user from a close distance while escaping her attention. Also, it is difficult to capture the user during the short time of the authentication process that usually happens unexpectedly. Consequently, we will focus on the scenario that the recorded material is collected with surveillance cameras. In such a case, the distance of recording is assumed to be at least 100 inches.

4. PERCEPTION OF AN IMAGE BY A HU-MAN OBSERVER

To explain how we designed IllusionPIN we first need to provide some background information about the perception of grayscale images. Based on the 2D Fourier transform which describes an image as a superimposition of sine wave gratings, we first examine the perception of a single sine




Figure 1: The image formation process on the retina according to the model of the pinhole camera. G_r is the projection of image G on the retina when is viewed from position N. Spatial positions are specified according to the coordinate system that is placed at the center of G.

wave grating and then we extend to arbitrary images.

4.1 Perception of Sine Wave Gratings

We study how a human observer perceives an image of a sine wave grating by studying how this is done by a single eyeball. In figure 1, we show how we model the behavior of an eyeball. We assume that it behaves as an ideal pinhole camera which directs light rays from the surface of an image G through a pinhole and onto the retina. On the retina, photoreceptors get activated and form a different 2D image G_r which corresponds to the visual information that the eye receives. This is a simplification of the real process, but offers an acceptable approximation, while being mathematically convenient. Under this model, G_r is shaped through the perspective projection of G on the retina, and consequently, G_r is a scaled version of G. This means that G and G_r are both sine wave gratings, but with different parameters, meaning different spatial frequency, contrast and phase. So, we can think of the image formation process on the retina as a projection that modifies the parameters of G. This leads us to make a distinction between the actual and the perceived parameters of G, which correspond to its parameters before and after its projection on the retina respectively. The perceived parameters of G are the parameters of G_r . Based on these remarks, given the actual parameters of a grating Gand the position N of an observer, we want to derive the perceived parameters of G.

We start by considering the relation between the actual and perceived contrast. Perceived contrast depends on the amount of light rays that reaches the retina from each part of an image, and consequently, we need to model the illumination of the 3D scene. In the context of our work, illumination results from the screen of the device, from external light sources, e.g. a light bulb, and from light reflected off surfaces in the surrounding space. We make two assumptions regarding illumination. The first is that illumination is uniform. This means that each part of the image emits the same amount of light. This is a fair assumption since we consider that the dominant light source is the screen of

the device. The second assumption is that the amount of light rays that reaches the retina is adequate to perceive the visual information of the image. This assumption is based on the ability of smartphone devices to adjust the brightness of their screens to the illumination level of the surrounding space. Following these assumptions, we lift the need to make a distinction between the actual and the perceived contrast of a grating, and from now on we will consider them as being equal.

Next, we consider perceived phase. As we have seen, G_r is a scaled version of G. Scaling preserves the number of cycles of a grating as well as its phase, and consequently, we will consider perceived phase to be equal to the actual phase.

Now we move to the calculation of the perceived spatial frequency. In figure 1, we can see that G subtends visual angle (θ_x,θ_y) . So, if $\vec{f}=({}^{n_x}/d_x,{}^{n_y}/d_y)$ is the actual spatial frequency of G, its perceived spatial frequency will be $\vec{f_p}=({}^{n_x}/\theta_x,{}^{n_y}/\theta_y)$, where n_x , n_y is the number of cycles in the horizontal and vertical directions, and (d_x,d_y) is the size of the image measured in units of length. All we need to do is to calculate (θ_x,θ_y) . To this end, we consider the general setting depicted in figure 1. The coordinate system for specifying spatial positions is placed at the center of the image where we assume that the observer is focused. The position of the observer is $N=(x_0,y_0,z_0)$, where $z_0>0$, meaning that the observer is in front of the image. For θ_x we have:

$$\theta_x = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{\overrightarrow{NA} \cdot \overrightarrow{NB}}{|\overrightarrow{NA}| \cdot |\overrightarrow{NB}|}\right) \tag{1}$$

For \overrightarrow{NA} we have:

$$\overrightarrow{NA} = \overrightarrow{NO} + \overrightarrow{OA}$$

$$= -(x_0, y_0, z_0) + (-\frac{d_x}{2}, 0, 0)$$

$$= (-x_0 - \frac{d_x}{2}, -y_0, -z_0)$$
(2)

Similarly for \overrightarrow{NB} we have:

$$\overrightarrow{NB} = (-x_0 + \frac{d_x}{2}, -y_0, -z_0) \tag{3}$$

Based on equations 2 and 3, from equation 1 we get:

$$\theta_x = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{x_0^2 - 1/4 \cdot d_x^2 + y_0^2 + z_0^2}{\sqrt{(x_0 + d_x/2)^2 + y_0^2 + z_0^2} \cdot \sqrt{(x_0 - d_x/2)^2 + y_0^2 + z_0^2}}\right) \tag{4}$$

Similarly, for θ_y we get:

$$\theta_y = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{y_0^2 - 1/4 \cdot d_y^2 + x_0^2 + z_0^2}{\sqrt{(y_0 + d_y/2)^2 + x_0^2 + z_0^2} \cdot \sqrt{(y_0 - d_y/2)^2 + x_0^2 + z_0^2}}\right)$$
(5)

From equations 4 and 5 we can calculate θ_x and θ_y .

If we transform equations 4 and 5 in spherical coordinates (r,θ,ϕ) , where $r\in(0,+\infty)$ is the viewing distance, $\theta\in(0,\pi)$ is the polar angle, and $\phi\in(-\pi/2,+\pi/2)$ is the azimuth angle, for $N=(r_0,\theta_0,\phi_0)$ we get:

$$\theta_x = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{r_0^2 - 1/4 \cdot d_x^2}{\sqrt{(r_0^2 + 1/4 \cdot d_x^2)^2 - (1/2 \cdot r_0 \sin \theta_0 \sin \phi_0 d_x)^2}}\right)$$
(6)

$$\theta_y = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{r_0^2 - 1/4 \cdot d_y^2}{\sqrt{(r_0^2 + 1/4 \cdot d_y^2)^2 - (1/2 \cdot r_0 \cos \theta_0 d_y)^2}}\right) \tag{7}$$




Figure 2: The Contrast Sensitive Function model as proposed by Mannos et al. [20].

We can use these equations to examine how viewing distance and viewing angle affect visual perception. If we vary the value of viewing distance r_0 , θ_x and θ_y can take all their possible values. When $r_0=0$ we get $\theta_x=\theta_y=\pi$. When r_0 approaches infinity, the factor r_0^2 dominates equations 6 and 7, and we get $\theta_x\approx\theta_y\approx\cos^{-1}\frac{r_0^2}{\sqrt{r_0^4}}=0$. In contrast, when we change the values of θ_0 or ϕ_0 , we just affect the denominators in equations 6 and 7 and the value of visual angle still heavily depends on the viewing distance. This shows that viewing distance is the main factor that affects visual perception. For this reason, in the following sections, when we need to demonstrate changes in perception we mainly consider variations in the viewing distance of the observer. However, to accurately estimate the way an image is perceived we have to consider the exact viewing position of the observer.

4.2 Contrast Sensitivity Function

The human visual system (HVS) demonstrates variability in its sensitivity to the perceived contrast of gratings with different perceived spatial frequencies. This variability is modeled through the contrast sensitivity function (CSF), which can be seen as a band-pass filter that the HVS applies to gratings according to their perceived spatial frequencies. Figure 2 provides the model of the CSF proposed by Mannos et al. [20]. CSF favors gratings with perceived spatial frequency magnitudes at a particular range around $10^{c}/d$. For example, a grating with perceived spatial frequency magnitude equal to 30 c/d must have bigger perceived contrast than a grating with perceived spatial frequency magnitude $10^{c/d}$ to be perceived with the same clarity. Gratings with perceived spatial frequency magnitude beyond the limit of the visual acuity cannot be perceived, and that's why CSF cuts off completely every perceived spatial frequency with magnitude over $60 \, c/d$.

4.3 Perception of Superimposed Sine Wave Gratings

According to the 2D Fourier transform, an image can be seen as a superimposition of sine wave gratings with unique actual spatial frequencies. The contribution of each grating is quantified by the magnitude of its Fourier coefficient $|X(\vec{f})|$, which is proportional to the grating's amplitude by a constant factor. Given an example image, in figure 3 (a) we visualize its actual 1D spectrum¹. The horizontal axis represents the magnitudes of actual spatial frequencies

¹The diagrams in figure 3 do not originate from an existing image. The reason is that we wanted to make the demonstrations simpler (smoother curves) in order to be more understandable.




Figure 3: (a) An example of how the actual spectrum of an image looks like. (b) The corresponding perceived spectrums when the same image is directly viewed from 3 different viewing distances.

to create a simple 2D graph instead of a 3D one. Unless stated otherwise, we will refer to 1D spectrums simply as spectrums. The vertical axis represents the contribution of gratings through the quantities $\ln{(1+|X(\vec{f})|)}$. When the actual spatial frequencies $\vec{f_i}, i=1,2,...n$ from n different gratings have the same magnitude $|\vec{f_1}|$, the corresponding $\ln{(1+|X(\vec{f_i})|)}$ values are added together and the result is considered the total contribution of the n gratings. Since we are dealing with digital images, we are using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) and the circles on the curve of figure 3 (a) correspond to the existing discrete magnitude values of actual spatial frequencies.

To understand how an image is perceived from a specific viewing position $N = (r_0, \theta_0, \phi_0)$, we use equations 6 and 7 to express the actual spectrum in perceived spatial frequencies. We call such a diagram the perceived spectrum. To aid our demonstrations, we consider the special case that the observer is looking directly at the image $(\theta_0 = \pi/2, \phi_0 = 0)$ and additionally holds that $d_x = d_y = d$. In such a case, from equations 6 and 7 we get $\theta_x = \theta_y = \theta$. As a consequence, it holds that $|\vec{f_p}| = d/\theta \cdot |\vec{f}|$ and the perceived spectrum has exactly the same form as the actual spectrum. In figure 3 (b), we depict the perceived spectrums of the image with the actual spectrum of figure 3 (a) when it is viewed from 3 different distances r_0 . The blue curve corresponds to the smallest viewing distance. As the viewing distance increases, the visual angle gets smaller and the factor d/θ gets bigger. As a consequence, the perceived spectrums are stretched and take the form of the cyan and the red curve. Since the contrast of a grating can be expressed through its amplitude, we can use the CSF to filter the perceived spectrums in order to understand how they are perceived. As we can see, the band-pass nature of the CSF favors the cyan curve. In particular, the CSF assigns small gain values to gratings with a big contribution in both the blue and the red curve. As a consequence, part of the visual information that the image is carrying is either perceived with less clarity or it is not perceived at all. For example, in the case of the red curve that the viewing distance has its bigger value, many gratings with high perceived spatial frequency magnitudes are completely cut-off. That's why when an image is viewed from a big distance, it is perceived as being blurred.

5. ILLUSIONPIN (IPIN) 5.1 Method

IllusionPIN is a PIN-based authentication scheme for touch-




Figure 4: (a) An example of how the perceived spectrums of two square images I_u^h and I_s^l look like when they are directly viewed from a small distance. I_u^h is the result of high-pass filtering and I_s^l of low-pass filtering. (b) The perceived spectrums of the same images when they are viewed from a bigger distance.

screen devices which offers shoulder-surfing resistance. The design of IllusionPIN is based on the simple observation that the user is always viewing the screen of her device from a smaller distance than a shoulder-surfer. Based on this, the core idea of IllusionPIN is to make the keypad on the touch-screen to be interpreted with a different digit ordering when the viewing distance is adequately large. This way, when the shoulder-surfer is standing far enough, he is viewing the keypad as being different from the one that the user is utilizing for her authentication, and consequently he is unable to extract the user's PIN. Also, the keypad is shuffled in every authentication attempt (or every digit entry) to avoid disclosing the spatial distribution of the pressed digits. We create the keypad of IllusionPIN with the method of hybrid images [25, 24] and we call it a hybrid keypad.

A hybrid keypad I is created by blending appropriately two normal keypads denoted with I_u and I_s . Our goal is I to be interpreted as being I_u when it is viewed from close up, and to be interpreted as being I_s when it is viewed from far away. That's why we call I_u the "user's keypad" and I_s the "shoulder-surfer's keypad". To create I, we process I_u with a high-pass filter and I_s with a low-pass filter. The filtering results in two new images, I_u^h and I_s^l , and we simply set $I = I_u^h + I_s^l$. So, a hybrid keypad is composed by a high spatial frequency component I_u^h and a low spatial frequency component I_s^l . To understand how the interpretation of I is changing, we consider that we directly view an example hybrid keypad from different distances. If the viewing distance is adequately small, the visual angle is such that the perceived spectrums of I_u^h and I_s^l occupy low perceived spatial frequency magnitudes as depicted in figure 4 (a). As we can see, the gain distribution of the CSF favors the perceived spectrum of I_u^h , and as a result I is interpreted as being I_u . In figure 4 (b) we depict the same perceived spectrums for a bigger viewing distance. As we can see, the perceived spectrums are stretched to higher perceived spatial frequency magnitudes and the CSF favors I_s^l . As a consequence, I_s dominates the perception of I. From intermediate viewing distances, both I_u^h and I_s^l are visible to a considerable extent and is not certain how I is interpreted. In figure 5, we provide an example hybrid image. In figure 5 (b) we downscale the image of figure 5 (a) to simulate how it is perceived when it is directly viewed from a 2-times bigger distance. From reading distance, we expect the digit ordering of the hybrid keypad in figure 5 (a) and (b) to be perceived as being different.



Figure 5: (a) A hybrid keypad (b) The simulated perception of the same hybrid keypad when it is directly viewed from distance which is 2 times bigger.

5.2 Parameters

Given the images I_u and I_s , the parameters that specify the hybrid keypad I are the parameters of the low-pass and the high-pass filters which are used to create I_u^h and I_s^l . For the low-pass filtering, we use a 2D Gaussian filter G_l , and for the high-pass filtering we use a filter $G_h = 1 - G_l^h$, where G_l^h is also a 2D Gaussian filter. In the spatial domain, both G_l and G_l^h have zero mean values and diagonal covariance matrices with equal standard deviations. This way, they affect an image by an equal number of pixels in each dimension. So, if σ_x^{ls} and σ_y^{ls} are the standard deviations of G_l in the horizontal and vertical dimensions, it will hold $\sigma_x^{ls} = \sigma_y^{ls}$. If σ_x^{lf} and σ_y^{lf} are the corresponding standard deviations in the frequency domain, it will hold $N_x^f/2\pi\sigma_x^{lf}=N_y^f/2\pi\sigma_y^{lf}\Rightarrow\sigma_y^{lf}=N_y^f/N_x^f\cdot\sigma_x^{lf}$, where (N_x^f,N_y^f) is the size of the filter in samples. This shows that we can completely define G_l by specifying either σ_y^{ls} or σ_y^{lf} . For convenience, we prefer to work in the frequency domain and consequently, we consider σ_y^{lf} as the single parameter of G_l . Similarly, we define G_h through the standard deviations of G_l^h , for which hold $\sigma_y^{hf} = N_y^f/N_x^f \cdot \sigma_x^{hf}$ in the frequency domain. Consequently, we consider σ_y^{hf} as the single parameter of G_h .

We have to make two additional remarks. The first is that we want a filtered image to maintain its original size in pixels, (N_x, N_y) , without the creation of additional frequency components in the stop-band of the filters. To this end, we perform the filtering in the frequency domain by multiplying the (N_x, N_y) -point DFT of the image with the corresponding filter. Because of this, the ratio N_y^f/N_x^f is equal to the ratio of the image dimensions N_y/N_x , which usually is $^{16}/9$. The second remark is that we measure σ_y^{lf} and σ_y^{hf} in number of cycles per image (c/im). This way, the visual effect of filtering is invariant to the size of the image.

5.3 TuningThe values of σ_y^{lf} and σ_y^{hf} create a trade-off between security and usability. When the value of σ_y^{lf} is increased, I_s^l becomes more visible since its perceived spectrum extends to higher spatial frequencies. This means that the user gets more distracted during her authentication and she may even need to bring the touchscreen closer to her eyes to clearly see the user's keypad. So, usability is negatively affected. However, a shoulder-surfer needs to reduce his viewing distance too in order to see the user's keypad with the same clarity, and consequently security is increased. When σ_y^{lf} is decreased, the opposite effects are caused and usability is increased while security is decreased. The same trade-off is observed when the value of σ_y^{hf} changes, since the clarity of I_u^h is affected. In particular, when σ_y^{hf} is decreased, usability is increased and security is decreased, while the opposite behavior is observed when σ_y^{hf} is increased.

To resolve the trade-off between security and usability, we first set the value of σ_y^{lf} in such a way that every possible level of security and usability is still possible depending on the value of σ_y^{hf} . Then, based on our security requirements, we set the minimum σ_y^{hf} that satisfies them. This way, usability is maximized under the constraint that our security needs are met. To set the value of σ_y^{lf} , we consider that if σ_y^{lf} gets very small, I_s^l will be that blurred that the original digits from I_s won't be recognizable, no matter the viewing distance. On the other hand, we have to consider that a user is usually holding her device at a particular distance. If σ_u^{lf} gets very big, the user's keypad won't be able to dominate the perception from that specific viewing distance. So, we set σ_u^{lf} to be close to the minimum value that allows the digits on I_s^l to be interpreted. We experimented with Nexus 6 and iPhone 6 smartphones which have representative keypads at their lock screens while they differ in size, resolution, and visual content. We concluded that a suitable value for σ_y^{lf} is 35 c/im. However, if the digits in another keypad are considerably different, e.g. much thicker, we may need to adjust the value of σ_y^{lf} to make them equally recognizable.

To specify the value of σ_y^{hf} we have to consider the given security requirements, which correspond to a safety distance value. In Section 6 we explain how we estimate the minimum value of σ_y^{hf} that respects a particular safety distance.

5.4 Discussion

For the design of IllusionPIN we follow the principle of obscurity, since the shoulder-surfer's keypad I_s obscures the user's keypad I_u . We could use any image in the place of I_s , but we decided to always use the image of keypad because this way I_u^h and I_s^l are visually aligned. This means that the digits in I_u^h and I_s^l overlap, and the less dominant keypad is perceived as noise, providing more clear interpretations of the hybrid keypad.

We also apply the principle of alteration by shuffling the user's keypad in every authentication attempt, or after every digit entry. Otherwise, it would be enough for a shouldersurfer to memorize just the spatial arrangement of the pressed digits. However, the shoulder-surfer's keypad always remains the same because this way we expect the user to become gradually better on ignoring it, resulting in faster authentication with fewer errors. Out of all the possible digit orderings that I_s may have, we choose the regular digit ordering, as in figure 5. The reason is that this is the ordering that we expect an attacker to be the most familiar with, and as a consequence, to have the tendency to recognize.

In our threat model, we have considered 4 shoulder-surfing scenarios with safety distance values which are equal to 25, 35, 45 and 60 inches. For each of these values we estimate the minimum σ_{y}^{hf} that keeps the user protected. This way we create 4 hybrid keypads for which hold that when security is increased, usability is decreased. These keypads are offered as predefined options to the user to pick the one that fits better to her needs.

VISIBILITY ALGORITHM

Algorithm 1 Visibility Algorithm

Require: hybrid keypad I, shoulder-surfer's keypad I_s , DAF filter, viewing position N, visibility index threshold value v_{th}

```
1: I_{sp} \leftarrow \text{calculate } 2D \text{ perceived spectrum of } I \text{ given } N
2: I_{s,sp} \leftarrow \text{calculate } 2D \text{ perceived spectrum of } I_s \text{ given } N
3: I_{sp}^{DAF} \leftarrow \text{apply DAF filter to } I_{sp}
4: I_{s,sp}^{DAF} \leftarrow \text{apply DAF filter to } I_{s,sp}
5: I^{DAF} \leftarrow \text{transform } I_{sp}^{DAF} \text{ to spatial domain}
6: I_{sp}^{DAF} \leftarrow \text{transform } I_{s,sp}^{DAF} \text{ to spatial domain}
7: Buttons(I^{DAF}) \leftarrow \text{segment the buttons of } I_{sp}^{DAF}
8: Buttons(I_{sp}^{DAF}) \leftarrow \text{segment the buttons of } I_{sp}^{DAF}
9: v \leftarrow \text{mean}(\text{MSSIM}(Buttons(I^{DAF}), Buttons(I_{sp}^{DAF})))
10: if v \geq v_{th} then
11: return No
12: else
13: return Yes
```

The visibility algorithm receives as inputs a hybrid keypad I and a viewing position N in the 3D space. It returns a binary prediction on whether the user's keypad of I is visible to an observer who is in position N. We use this prediction either to estimate the minimum safety distance that corresponds to a given hybrid keypad, or to create a hybrid keypad that respects a given safety distance. Algorithm 1 provides the pseudocode of the visibility algorithm.

6.1 Algorithm

6.1.1 Distance-As-Filtering

In the first step of the visibility algorithm, we simulate the way I is perceived from the viewing position N by using the distance-as-filtering hypothesis proposed by Loftus et al. [18]. The distance-as-filtering hypothesis states that we can simulate the way an image is perceived from a particular viewing distance by filtering the image with an appropriate low-pass filter. The intuition behind this method is based on the effect that the CSF has in the visual perception of an image. However, as explained by Loftus et al. [18], the perception of an image from a particular distance and the perception of the corresponding filtered image are not identical, but they are equivalent with respect to performance on some task. Loftus et al. experimentally verified the distance-as-filtering hypothesis for face recognition tasks by designing a low-pass filter of a particular form. Our task is the recognition of digits on hybrid keypads, which differs from face recognition. However, both tasks require the perception of almost equally fine visual details, and consequently, we expect the low-pass filter designed by Loftus et al. to be applicable in our task too. We should also note that in the experiments conducted by Loftus et al., every observer was looking directly at an image and his viewing position was completely defined by his viewing distance. We use the same filter to simulate the perception of an observer who is at a random viewing position, by making the simplifying assumption that the perception of an image depends on the visual angle that it subtends, no matter where the observer stands.

The low-pass filter proposed by Loftus et al. [18] has constant gain equal to 1 until the perceived spatial frequency magnitude $|\vec{f_0}|$, and then drops until it reaches the value 0




Figure 6: We consider an example hybrid keypad $I=I_s^l+I_u^h$. In the first row, the third button of $I_s^{l,DAF}$ is depicted when I_s^l is directly viewed from different distances. In the second row, the corresponding button of I^{DAF} is depicted when I is directly viewed from the same distances as I_s^l . In the third row, the value of the visibility index for each viewing distance is provided.

at the perceived spatial frequency magnitude $|\vec{f_1}|$. We call it DAF filter and it is mathematically defined in the following way:

$$DAF(\vec{f_p}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |\vec{f_p}| < |\vec{f_0}| \\ 1 - \left(\frac{\log(|\vec{f_p}|/|\vec{f_0}|)}{\log(r)}\right)^2 & \text{if } |\vec{f_0}| \le |\vec{f_p}| \le |\vec{f_1}| \\ 0 & \text{if } |\vec{f_p}| > |\vec{f_1}| \end{cases}$$
(8)

where r is a positive constant for which holds r > 1, and $|\vec{f_0}| = |\vec{f_1}|/r$. So, the parameters of the filter are the values of r and $|\vec{f_1}|$. Loftus et al. conducted 4 different face recognition experiments to specify the values of the parameters, and concluded that r = 3, while $|\vec{f_1}|$ may be equal to 25, 31 or $42^{c}/d$, depending on the task at hand. In Section 6.2.2, we explain how we specified $|\vec{f_1}|$ for the purposes of our work.

6.1.2 Visibility Index

In the second step of our algorithm, we compute the visibility index which quantifies how visible the user's keypad of I from the viewing position N is. We remind that $I = I_s^l + I_u^h$. To compute the visibility index, we apply the DAF filter both to I and to I_s^l , and we create the images I^{DAF} and $I_s^{l,DAF}$, respectively. This way we simulate how I and I_s^l are perceived when they are viewed from position N. Then, we separate in equal rectangular regions the buttons from I^{DAF} and $I_s^{l,DAF}$, and we compute the similarity of the corresponding buttons with the mean structural similarity index (MSSIM) [39]. The visibility index is the mean value of the 10 MSSIM index values from the pairs of corresponding buttons.

The visibility index is the cornerstone of our algorithm and we would like to clarify its behavior and the intuition behind it. Given a reference image I_1 and a distorted version of I_1 denoted with I_2 , MSSIM index measures the similarity between I_1 and I_2 . The maximum value of the MSSIM index is 1 and is obtained when I_1 and I_2 are identical, meaning that I_2 is not distorted at all. In our case, $I_s^{l,DAF}$ is the reference image and I^{DAF} is considered a distorted version of $I_s^{l,DAF}$ because of the presence of the user's keypad. The

maximum value of the visibility index is 1 and is obtained when the user's keypad is completely out of perception. In figure 6, we demonstrate the behavior of the visibility index for an example hybrid keypad I. In the first row, we depict the third button of $I_s^{l,DAF}$, when I_s^l is directly viewed from different distances. In the second row, we depict the third button of I^{DAF} , when I is directly viewed from the same distances as I_s^l . In the third row, we provide the value of the visibility index for each viewing distance. From left to right, the viewing distance is increasing. As we can see, as the viewing distance is increasing, the digit 9 which belongs to the user's keypad is fading away and the visibility index is increasing. When the visibility index becomes big enough, the digit from the user's keypad is no longer visible. We would like to make clear that we apply the MSSIM index between separated buttons and not between $I_s^{l,DAF}$ and I^{DAF} as a whole, because in $I_s^{l,DAF}$ and I^{DAF} exist big, almost identical, regions and the MSSIM index would have a very big value irrespectively of the buttons form.

The MSSIM index follows the premise that the main function of the human eye is to extract structural information from the viewing field. This connection to human perception is the main reason that we decided to use the MSSIM index. An additional advantage is that MSSIM index is very easily computed.

6.1.3 Threshold Value of the Visibility Index

Let's assume that we are given a hybrid keypad I and an observer who first views I from position N_1 and then from position N_2 . If the corresponding visibility index values are v_1 and v_2 and holds $v_2 > v_1$, we expect the user's keypad to be less visible from position N_2 than from N_1 . If $v_1 \simeq v_2$, we expect the user's keypad to be almost equally visible in both cases. This is a direct consequence of the way we have defined the visibility index. Now let's assume that two different hybrid keypads I_1 and I_2 are viewed by the same observer from positions N_1 and N_2 , respectively. If the corresponding visibility index values are v_1 and v_2 and holds $v_2 > v_1$, we expect the user's keypads of I_1 to be more clearly visible than that of I_2 . Similarly, if $v_1 \simeq v_2$, we expect the user's keypads of I_1 and I_2 to be almost equally visible. This is the main assumption that we make about the behavior of the visibility index and we expect to hold in its reverse form too. This means that if the user's keypad from a hybrid keypad I_1 is more clearly visible than the user's keypad of a different hybrid keypad I_2 when they are viewed from positions N_1 and N_2 , respectively, then for the corresponding visibility index values v_1 and v_2 we expect to hold $v_2 > v_1$. If the user's keypads from I_1 and I_2 are almost equally visible, then we expect $v_1 \simeq v_2$. It is important to mention that we expect these assumptions to hold only for the same observer. The reason is that the visual capabilities of different observers vary. For example, if a person with strong vision is directly viewing a hybrid keypad from a particular distance and is able to recognize the user's keypad with difficulty, then a person with weaker vision will have to go closer to the image to interpret it in the same way. As a result, the hybrid keypad will be interpreted in the same way by the two observers, but the value of the visibility index will be different.

Based on the aforementioned remarks, we set as a threshold v_{th} the value of the visibility index when a particular ob-

server is able to marginally recognize the digits of a user's keypad. Then, the visibility algorithm calculates the visibility index v for the inputs I and N, and compares it with v_{th} . If $v \geq v_{th}$, we predict that the user's keypad cannot be interpreted by the observer. If $v < v_{th}$, we predict that the observer is able to interpret the digits of the user's keypad. Since the threshold value will vary for different observers, we universally use the v_{th} value that corresponds to people with the strongest vision, because we don't want to mistakenly predict that the user's keypad is not visible when it is.

6.2 Parameter Tuning

The parameters of the visibility algorithm are the spatial frequency $|\vec{f_1}|$ and the threshold v_{th} . To specify their values, we conducted a user study.

6.2.1 Data Collection

Participants. We recruited 11 participants from our institution, who were between 21 and 34 years of age. Our aim was to have participants with strong vision and that's why they all were of young age. Out of the 11 participants, 6 reported that they had either myopia or astigmatism, but they were wearing their glasses during the process. The rest of the participants reported that they did not have any problem.

Materials. We used 2 different phones, a Nexus 6 and an iPhone 6. These two phones have displays with the same dimension ratio (= $^{16}/_{9}$), but different size and different resolution. The Nexus 6 has display size 5.96 inches and resolution 1440×2560 , while the iPhone 6 has display size 4.7 inches and resolution 750×1334 pixels. For each phone, we created 7 different categories of hybrid keypads. In 6 of them, we set $\sigma_y^{lf} = 35 \ ^{c}/im$, since this is the value that we have decided to use in our hybrid keypads. The value of σ_y^{hf} was equal to 120, 160, 200, 240, 280 and 320 $^{c}/im$. In the seventh category, we tried a different value for σ_y^{lf} , which we set equal to 60 $^{c}/im$, while $\sigma_y^{hf} = 200 \ ^{c}/im$. For each category, we created 30 hybrid keypads which had user's keypads with different digit ordering.

Procedure. Each subject participated in at least 3 sessions. Each session was split in 3 trials. The goal of each trial was to specify a viewing position N, from which the user's keypad of a hybrid keypad was marginally recognized. The hybrid keypad was displayed on a smartphone device. To specify the viewing position N of the participant, we used spherical coordinates; meaning that $N = (r_0, \theta_0, \phi_0)$. The coordinate system was placed at the center of the image. In each trial, we kept θ_0 and ϕ_0 constant and we varied r_0 .

The exact procedure was the following. During each trial, a smartphone device was placed on a tripod that matched the height of the participant. This way, when the participant was looking at the phone, θ_0 was $\pi/2$ rad. To change the value of θ_0 , we tilted the phone on the tripod. Also, the participant was able to move relatively to the tripod in order to change the value of ϕ_0 . Having specified θ_0 and ϕ_0 , the participant started to approach the phone from a big distance r_0 . The initial value of r_0 was big enough to keep the user's keypad out of perception. As the participant was approaching to the phone, the user's keypad was starting to become visible. We recorded the maximum r_0 from which the participant was able to read the digits on the user's key-




Figure 7: (a) The third button from a hybrid keypad. We simulate the perception of this button from position $(63, \pi/2, 0)$ by using DAF filters with different $|\vec{f_1}|$ values. (b) The filtered button with $|\vec{f_1}| = 25 \ ^c/d$. (c) The filtered button with $|\vec{f_1}| = 31 \ ^c/d$. (d) The filtered button with $|\vec{f_1}| = 42 \ ^c/d$.

pad. In particular, the participant had 15 seconds to read all the 10 digits and only one mistake was allowed. The time limit is connected to the fact that a shoulder-surfer has limited time to observe the user while entering her authentication credentials. Also, as the participant was approaching the phone, each time he or she failed to read the digits, we switched to a different hybrid keypad from the same category in order to be sure that the participant is not getting familiar with a specific digit ordering. This is the reason that we created multiple hybrid keypads from each category for each phone.

For each session, the value of θ_0 was constant. Specifically, θ_0 was equal to $\pi/2$, $\pi/4$ or $\pi/3$ rad. On each trial of a session, we had a different value for ϕ_0 . During the first trial, we had $\phi_0=0$ rad, during the second $\phi_0=\pi/6$ rad, and during the third $\phi_0=\pi/3$ rad. Since $\theta_0\in(0,\pi)$ and $\phi_0\in(-\pi/2,+\pi/2)$, the values of θ_0 and ϕ_0 that we considered belonged to the 1/4 of the available space. The reason is that the visual angle is symmetric with respect to the xy, zx and zy planes as can be easily seen in equations 4 and 5. In addition, on each session we used hybrid keypads from a single category and we used only one smartphone device.

Last but not least, we have to comment on the illumination of the scene since it affects the perception of the hybrid keypad. The experiments were conducted in an indoor space with normal artificial lighting and the smartphone was carefully placed to avoid distracting reflections from surrounding objects. In addition, the brightness of the screen was set to its maximum value. In general, we tried to create favorable conditions for the observers, since the collected data would be used for the estimation of the security strength of IPIN, and we wanted to correspond to the worst case scenario.

Collected data. An entry in our dataset is composed of the identification number of a participant, the hybrid keypad that was at view, and the viewing position from which the participant was able to marginally recognize the digits from the user's keypad. In total, we have 270 entries. We tried to balance the number of data that we collected with each phone and from each hybrid keypad category. We stopped collecting data when the statistical analysis provided robust results with respect to the variables of our data.

6.2.2 Estimation of the DAF Filter Parameters

We considered a subset of the data with 81 entries from 3 participants and we calculated the visibility index for each entry. We expected the behavior of the DAF filter to have

two characteristics. The first was the visibility index to have small standard deviation for each participant. The second was the filtered hybrid keypads to have a user's keypad with digits that can be marginally recognized. Loftus et al. [18] suggested 3 possible values for $|\vec{f_1}|$, depending on the task at hand. Unfortunately, there was not a unique value for $|\vec{f_1}|$ that could create a DAF filter with the desired behavior for our task. The reason was that when the viewing position $N = (r_0, \theta_0, \phi_0)$ of a participant had big ϕ_0 or small θ_0 , the corresponding value of the visibility index was significantly smaller. This means that when the participants were viewing a hybrid keypad from an angle, they had to approach closer to the screen than expected according to the visibility index values. We assume that this problem is connected with the fact that the brightness of LCD screens, like the ones used by iPhone 6 and Nexus 6, dims when an observer is viewing from an angle. As a result, when the participants were viewing from an angle, the perceived contrast was lower and more gratings from the hybrid keypad were not perceived. To account for this effect, we gradually reduce the value of $|\vec{f_1}|$ as ϕ_0 is increasing and θ_0 is decreasing. Based on these remarks, we defined the DAF filter in 2 steps.

In the first step, the goal was to specify the initial value of $|\vec{f}_1|$ when the brightness of the screen is unaffected by the viewing angle. The possible values for $|\vec{f_1}|$ were 25, 31 and 42 c/d, as proposed by Loftus et al. [18]. To select the most suitable value, out of the 81 entries in our dataset, we singled out those with $\phi_0 = 0$ and $\theta = \pi/2$, meaning the entries that corresponded to an observer who is looking directly at the screen. Then, since this subset had a small size, we applied the 3 DAF filter variants to the corresponding hybrid keypads and we picked the filter that created hybrid keypads with marginally recognizable user's keypad. Figure 7 (a) provides the third button of a hybrid keypad from our subset. The digit of the shoulder-surfer's keypad is 3 and the digit of the user's keypad is 6. We simulate how the button is perceived when it is directly viewed from 63 inches, since this viewing position was part of our data for this hybrid keypad. In figure 7 (b), we used a DAF filter with $|\vec{f_1}| = 25$ $^c/a$, in figure 7 (c), $|\vec{f_1}| = 31$ $^c/a$, and in figure 7 (d), $|\vec{f_1}| = 42 \, c/d$. As we can see, the digit on the button is interpreted as 3 in figure 7 (b), it is marginally interpreted as 6 (or even 3) in figure 7 (c), and is clearly interpreted as being 6 in figure 7 (d). Following this way of reasoning, we concluded that the most suitable initial value for $|f_1|$ is

In the second step, we modeled how the value of $|\vec{f_1}|$ changes as a function of θ_0 and ϕ_0 . We assume that $|\vec{f_1}| = 31 \cdot A(\phi_0, \theta_0)$. For the function A, we have:

$$A(\phi_0, \theta_0) = \left(1 - \left(\frac{\phi_0}{\pi/2}\right)^{k_a}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \left(\frac{\theta_0 - \pi/2}{\pi/2}\right)^{k_a}\right) \quad (9)$$

where k_a is a positive real number that controls how fast the value of $|\vec{f_1}|$ drops when ϕ_0 is increasing or θ_0 is decreasing. We use the same number k_a in both factors because we assume that the brightness of the screen changes in the same way when either ϕ_0 or θ_0 is changing. We considered five different cases for the effect of ϕ_0 and θ_0 . The first was that they don't affect $|\vec{f_1}|$, meaning that A=1. The rest

Table 1: The standard deviation of the visibility index for three participants p_1 , p_2 and p_3 , when different forms of the function $A(\phi_0, \theta_0)$ are used. The minimum standard deviation value for each participant is highlighted.

	A = 1	$k_a = 2.5$	$k_a = 3$	$k_a = 3.5$	$k_a = 4$				
p_1	0.0496	0.0181	0.0138	0.0159	0.0212				
p_2	0.0546	0.0167	0.0112	0.0141	0.0223				
p_3	0.0560	0.0224	0.0178	0.0183	0.0240				

four cases corresponded to $k_a=2.5, k_a=3, k_a=3.5$ and $k_a=4$. For each of these cases, we created the corresponding DAF filter and we computed the visibility index for all the 81 entries in our subset. Then, for each participant we calculated the standard deviation of the visibility index. In Table 1 we provide the results from this process. Each row corresponds to a different participant and each column corresponds to a different function $A(\phi_0,\theta_0)$. As we can see, all the participants demonstrated the smallest standard deviation for $k_a=3$, and consequently, this was the choice we made. We have to note that the data we used were from participants without reported problems in their vision, because we wanted to increase the probability of defining a DAF filter that simulates the visual perception of a person with strong vision.

6.2.3 Estimation of the Threshold Value for the Visibility Index

According to the assumptions we made in Section 6.1.3, the visibility index should have almost identical values for each participant in our dataset, irrespectively of the phone that was used during the data collection process, or the categories that the hybrid keypads belonged to. To verify this, we used the DAF filter we defined in the previous section to compute the visibility index for each of the 270 entries in our dataset. Then, we computed the coefficient of variation (cv) for the visibility index values of each participant. We provide the results in Table 2. As we can see, the cv is lower than 10% for every participant, and consequently, we concluded that the values of the visibility index are homogeneous for each participant.

We wanted to further test the assumption that the values of the visibility index for each participant are independent of the smartphone device that was used. Also, we wanted to test the assumption that the values of the visibility index vary significantly between different participants. We tested both of these assumptions by applying a two-factor ANOVA with randomized complete block design. We used data from the participants who were exposed to both phones during the data collection process. These were 5 out of the 11 participants. The visibility index values from different participants were assigned to separate blocks, and consequently, the participants were the blocking factor. The factor of interest within each block was the type of the phone; Nexus 6 or *iPhone* 6. Since the normality and homoscedasticity conditions were satisfied, we were able to compute the p-value of the two factors. The p-value for the type of the phone was 12.07% > 5% and we concluded that the smartphone device is not a statistically significant factor of variation for the value of the visibility index. In contrast, the p-value for the participants was less than 1% and consequently, the




Figure 8: The box and whisker plot with median notch after applying the Kruskal-Wallis test in our whole dataset with the participants as the factor of variation.

values of the visibility index between the participants have statistically significant differences.

We further tested if participants are a factor of variation by considering the whole dataset with the 11 participants. Our intention was to apply an one-way ANOVA, but the normality and homoscedasticity conditions weren't satisfied, and as a result, we applied the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. The p-value was less than 1% and we confirmed that there are statistically significant differences between the visibility index values of different participants. In figure 8, we provide the corresponding box and whisker plot with median notch of the visibility indexes of all participants. As we can see, the participants formed three main groups based on their visibility index values. Participants p1, p2, p3, p4 and p5 formed the first group, p6, p8, p10 and p11 formed the second group, and p7 and p9 formed the third group. We confirmed this grouping of the participants by performing pairwise comparisons with Man-Whitney tests. Each group had participants with visibility index values in a different range and this is because the participants demonstrated different visual capabilities. The first group had the participants with the highest visibility index values and consequently, these were the people who demonstrated the strongest vision. The mean value of the visibility index in this group was 0,92996 with standard error 0.00115. The desired threshold value of the visibility index was set equal to 0.93.

7. SAFETY DISTANCE7.1 Shoulder-Surfing With a Naked Eye

We assume that we are given a hybrid keypad I and an observer at a position $N=(r_0,\theta_0,\phi_0)$. If d_s is a safety distance for I, then $\forall \theta_0,\phi_0$, if $r_0\geq d_s$, the user's keypad can not be interpreted by the observer. Of course, we are interested in the minimum possible value of d_s , because it corresponds to the maximum protection that I can offer against shoulder surfing. In addition, as we have seen in previous sections, even in the case that we are given a desired d_s and we are asked to design a hybrid keypad I that satisfies it, we aim to maximize the usability of I by making d_s to be the minimum possible value of the safety distance.

To estimate the minimum d_s for a hybrid keypad I, we first examine from which viewing positions at the 3D space the user's keypad of I is visible. We call the resulting region of the 3D space, "visibility region". To estimate the visi-

Table 2: The coefficient of variation for the visibility index values of each participant in our dataset.

	p_1	p_2	p_3	p_4	p_5	p_6	p_7	p_8	p_9	p_{10}	p_{11}
cv (%)	1.85	1.51	1.48	1.92	2.01	5.41	2.66	2.06	2.54	2.51	3.86




Figure 9: The visibility region of a hybrid keypad I created with $\sigma_y^{lf}=35~^c/_{lm}$ and $\sigma_y^{hf}=320~^c/_{lm}$ for the iphone~6 smartphone.

bility region of a hybrid keypad, we applied the visibility algorithm for viewing positions from a dense grid at the 3D space. For a hybrid keypad I created with $\sigma_y^{lf} = 35$ c/im and $\sigma_y^{hf} = 320$ c/im for the iphone 6 smartphone, the visibility region is depicted in Figure 9. The depicted zx plane can be used as a reference to understand the geometry of the visibility region. The user's keypad is visible when I is viewed from positions which are either on the depicted surface or they are enclosed by it. The coordinate system is the same as the one used in Figure 1, with the image placed in position (0,0,0). In addition, for all viewing positions $N=(x_0,y_0,z_0)$, we assume that $z_0>5$ inches. The visibility region is symmetric with respect to planes zx and yz. This is something that we expected because of the symmetry in equations 4 and 5. In general, the form of the visibility region is similar to that of an ellipsoid. If we consider spherical coordinates, the safety distance will be slightly bigger than the biggest viewing distance r_0 of a position $N = (r_0, \theta_0, \phi_0)$ that belongs to the visibility region. Since the form of the visibility region is ellipsoidal, for the position N with the maximum r_0 will hold $\theta_0 = \pi/2$ and $\phi_0 = 0$. This is a result that we expected, since for a given r_0 , from equations 6 and 7, we can easily derive that the visual angle is maximized when $\theta_0 = \pi/2$ and $\phi_0 = 0$.

In our threat model, we have assumed that for the viewing position $N=(r_0,\theta_0,\phi_0)$ of the shoulder-surfer holds $|\phi_0|\geq \pi/6$ rad. In the visibility region, as $|\phi_0|$ is increasing, the maximum r_0 is decreasing. As a consequence, we define the safety distance to be the minimum distance d_s for which holds that from the viewing position $N=(r_s,\pi/2,\pi/6)$, an observer with strong vision is unable recognize the digits on the user's keypad. Based on this definition, if we are a given a hybrid keypad I, we can apply the visibility algorithm for viewing positions $N=(r_0,\pi/2,\pi/6)$ with varying r_0 , and set

the safety distance to be equal to the minimum r_0 for which holds that the corresponding visibility index v is greater than v_{th} . We are also interested in the case that we are given as a security requirement a safety distance d_s and we have to set the value of σ_y^{hf} . To do this, we vary the value of σ_y^{hf} that we use to create I, and we apply the visibility algorithm for the position $N=(d_s,\pi/2,\pi/6)$. We create I with the minimum σ_y^{hf} for which holds that the visibility index v is greater than v_{th} . This way we were able to create the 4 hybrid keypads that we provide as predefined options to the users of IllusionPIN.

7.2 Shoulder-Surfing Through a Surveillance Camera

We assume that we are given a hybrid keypad I, a smartphone device where I is displayed on, and a surveillance camera at position $N=(r_0,\theta_0,\phi_0)$. To estimate the safety distance, we calculate the minimum r_0 for which holds that $\forall \theta_0,\phi_0$, the camera is unable to capture the user's keypad I_u^h . We assume that the camera is unable to capture I_u^h when a cycle from the grating of I_u^h with the biggest cycle size, occupies at most a pixel when it is projected on the image plane of the camera.

We start by estimating the smallest spatial frequency components which are present in I_u^h , since they will correspond to the cycles with the biggest size. We remind that I_u^h is the result of applying the high-pass filter G_h to I_u . We assume that when G_h assigns a gain value less than 0.5 to a spatial frequency, the corresponding grating is cut off. The isocontour of G_h that corresponds to the value 0.5 will be an ellipse that we call the cut-off ellipse. We consider that all the spatial frequencies enclosed by the cut-off ellipse are cut off. Since $G_h = 1 - G_l^h$, where $G_l^h(f_x, f_y) = \exp(-1/2\sigma_x^{hf} \cdot f_x^2 - 1/2\sigma_y^{hf} \cdot f_y^2)$, for the axes of the cut-off ellipse will hold:

$$a = \sqrt{2\sigma_x^{hf} \log\left(\frac{1}{0.5}\right)} \tag{10}$$

$$b = \sqrt{2\sigma_y^{hf} \log\left(\frac{1}{0.5}\right)} \tag{11}$$

To describe the region of the spatial frequencies which are cut off by the filter in a simpler way, we consider the rectangle with the biggest area that is inscribed to the cut-off ellipse. We assume that the spatial frequencies which are cut off by the filter, are those enclosed by this rectangle instead of those enclosed by the cut-off ellipse. We call this rectangle, the cut-off rectangle. For the biggest horizontal and vertical spatial frequency components in the cut-off rectangle will hold:

$$f_x^s = a \cdot \sqrt{2}/2 \tag{12}$$

$$f_y^s = b \cdot \sqrt{2}/2 \tag{13}$$

Based on these remarks, we conclude that for a grating from I_u^h with spatial frequency $\vec{f} = (f_x, f_y)$ will hold $f_x \geq f_x^s$

and $f_y \geq f_y^s$. For an example filter G_h with $(\sigma_x^{hf}, \sigma_y^{hf}) = (120.9375 \, ^c/_{im}, 215 \, ^c/_{im})$, we calculate $f_x^s = 100.69 \, ^c/_{im}$ and $f_y^s = 178.99 \, ^c/_{im}$.

After measuring the smallest frequency components present in I_u^h , we should calculate the length of the corresponding cycles. To this end, we need to know the resolution $x_r \times y_r$ of the screen that is used to display I and the number of pixels per inch (ppi). Based on that, we can calculate the biggest cycle size in each dimension:

$$l_x = \frac{x_r/ppi}{f_x^s} \tag{14}$$

$$l_y = \frac{y_r/p_{pi}}{f_y^s} \tag{15}$$

where $^{x_r/pp_i}$ and $^{y_r/pp_i}$ express the length of the display in the horizontal and vertical dimension respectively, measured in inches. If we assume that I is displayed on a Nexus 6 device, the resolution is 1440×2560 pixels and ppi = 493 $^p/in$. As a consequence, we find that $l_x = 0.029$ inches and $l_y = 0.029$ inches. As we can see, both lengths are equal. This is something that we expected, because we have designed G_h to be isotropic in the spatial domain.

To estimate the safety distance d_s , we assume that we have a square stimulus c of size (l_x, l_y) , which is viewed by a camera in the same way that an image is viewed by a human observer in Figure 1. This means that the camera is modeled as an ideal pinhole camera. In this setting, the camera is in position $N = (r_0, \theta_0, \phi_0)$. As we increase r_0 , c subtends increasingly smaller angle. The camera will not be able to capture c for the first time when c will subtend visual angle that corresponds exactly to one pixel. As a result, safety distance will be the biggest distance for which holds that c is projected to exactly one pixel. From equations 6 and 7, we can easily see that a specific visual angle corresponds to the biggest r_0 when $\theta_0 = \pi/2$ and $\phi_0 = 0$. As a result, in our setting, we assume that the camera is in position $N=(d_s, \pi/2, 0)$, while c subtends visual angle that corresponds to exactly one pixel on the image plane. Since c is a square stimulus, we simply use perspective projection in the horizontal dimension to find that for d_s holds:

$$d_s = f \cdot l_x / s_p \tag{16}$$

where f is the focal length of the camera, and s_p is the pixel size. If we assume that the surveillance camera has the specifications of a *Nexus* 6 camera, for the pixel size will hold $s_p = 0.001127 \ mm$ and for the focal length $f = 3.8 \ mm$. As a result, we get $d_s = 97.81 \ inches$.

In our threat model, we assumed that for this attack scenario the surveillance camera is recording from a distance that is at least 100 inches. According to the previous calculations, for a hybrid keypad created with $(\sigma_x^{hf}, \sigma_y^{hf}) = (120.9375 \, ^c/im, 215 \, ^c/im)$ and displayed on a Nexus 6 smartphone, our security requirement is satisfied. It is important to note that this specific keypad is the second most usable hybrid keypad out of the 4 predefined options that we offer to Nexus 6 users. In addition, we have to consider that all the assumptions that we made during our calculations were in favor of the attacker. Some examples are that we required the camera to be unable to capture all the gratings from I_u^h and not a subset of them, that we disregarded

the effect of I_s^l , and that we overestimated the specifications of the surveillance camera. All these show that under real life conditions, is extremely improbable to capture the user's keypad of IllusionPIN with a surveillance camera.

8. EVALUATION

We would like to estimate the probability of underestimating the safety distance with the visibility algorithm. In other words, we would like to know how probable it is for a shoulder-surfer to steal the credentials of an IllusionPIN user, even if the viewing distance of the attacker is equal or bigger than the estimated safety distance. To this end, we performed simulated shoulder-surfing attacks against IllusionPIN.

Participants. We recruited 21 participants who were undergraduate and graduate students from our institution. All participants were less than 40 years old and they had either normal or corrected vision. Note that all experiments in this work were approved by the IRB of our institution.

Materials. We built an application for the Android operating system to aid the execution of the simulated attacks. The application was run on a Nexus 6 phone and allowed the users to create five keypad categories that we denote with c_i , for i=1,2,3,4,5. The first 4 categories were hybrid keypads that corresponded to the 4 safety distance values d_s^i , i=1,2,3,4, that we have considered in our threat model. All hybrid keypads were created with $\sigma_y^{lf}=35~c/im$. Category c_1 was created with $\sigma_y^{hf}=145~c/im$ and corresponded to $d_s^1=60$ inches, c_2 had $\sigma_y^{hf}=215~c/im$ and $d_s^2=45$ inches, c_3 had $\sigma_y^{hf}=305~c/im$ and $d_s^3=35$ inches, and c_4 had $\sigma_y^{hf}=440~c/im$ and $d_s^4=25$ inches. Category c_5 was a normal keypad that is used in regular PIN authentication.

Procedure. Participants worked in pairs. Each pair performed 10 simulations in total. In the first 5 simulations one participant was playing the role of the attacker and the other the role of the user. Then, the participants were asked to switch roles and repeat the same 5 simulations. The first 5 simulations s_i , i=1,2,3,4,5, were performed in the following way. The shoulder-surfer was placed at position $N=(d_s^i,\pi/2,\pi/6)$, while the phone was at position $N=(0,\pi/2,0)$. The user freely created a 4-digit PIN with a keypad from category c_i , and was asked to successfully authenticate 3 times. The attacker was able to observe the user during all authentication attempts and then was asked to replicate the PIN. During s_5 , we set $d_s^5=d_s^1$, which was the biggest distance that we considered.

Before the simulations, we asked the participants to practice with all the keypad categories by authenticating 10 times with each category. During the simulations, we tried to create favorable conditions for the attackers. In particular, the simulations were performed in a silent indoor place with adequate illumination, while the brightness of the phone screen was set to its maximum level. In addition, the users were asked to keep the screen of the phone in the view of the attackers during the authentication. It is also important to clarify that we purposely selected participants of young age with normal or corrected vision, because these participants could impersonate skillful shoulder-surfers.

Collected data. We simulated 84 shoulder-surfing attacks against IllusionPIN, and none of them was successful. The

best performance was demonstrated by 2 participants who managed to correctly replicate 3 out of 4 PIN digits in one attack each. All 21 attacks against the regular PIN authentication were successful.

Data analysis. It is very important that none of the attackers was able to break IllusionPIN. We should also note that the category of a hybrid keypad wasn't a factor that affected the success rate of the attackers. Based on that, we consider that we have 21 independent samples and we calculate the Clopper-Pearson interval for the success rate of shoulder-surfing attacks. With probability 95%, we expect the interval [0, 0.1329] to contain the success rate. If we increase the sample size, the range of the interval will be reduced. However, based on the unfavorable conditions for our scheme, the visual capabilities of the participants, and the performance of the attackers, we expect that we have to record a very large number of attacks to find a successful one. As a result, we are already confident that the success rate is much closer to 0 than to 0.1329.

9. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING RE-MARKS

The main goal of our work was to design a PIN-based authentication scheme that would be resistant against shouldersurfing attacks. To this end, we created IllusionPIN. We quantified the level of resistance against shoulder-surfing by introducing the notion of safety distance, which we estimated with a visibility algorithm. In the context of the visibility algorithm, we had to model at a basic level how the human visual system works. In this process, we made a number of simplifying assumptions that limit the accuracy of our calculations. The most obvious example is the pinhole camera model that we used to describe the image formation process in the eye. This is a widely used model, but disregards important parts of the human eye, like the lens. In Section 6.1.1, we made an additional simplification by assuming that the perception of an image depends on the visual angle that it subtends, no matter where the observer stands. A problem with this assumptions is that, depending on the viewing position, we may perceive the dimensions of an image as having a different ratio. For example, as we can see in equations 6 and 7, when ϕ_0 is increasing, only θ_x is decreasing and the image is perceived as being squeezed in the horizontal dimension. As a consequence, the image of a circle could be perceived as the image of an ellipse when it is viewed from a big angle. It is interesting to note that even if we did not explicitly model such phenomena, the factor $A(\phi_0, \theta_0)$ that we estimated in Section 6.2.2 may have accounted for them implicitly to some extent. It is very important that despite all these simplifying assumptions that we made, our results led us to conclusions that agreed with our expectations. For example, the visibility region depicted in Figure 9 has the expected ellipsoidal form, while the visibility index demonstrated the behavior we described in Section 6.1.3. So, more strict assumptions, followed by more detailed models, could improve the accuracy of our current results, but we expect the general conclusions to remain the

The visibility algorithm forms the core of our work and we would like to examine whether it can be used to assess the visibility of images other than hybrid keypads. The visibility algorithm uses the MSSIM index which quantifies the distor-



Figure 10: A button from a different kind of hybrid keypad. The shoulder-surfer's keypad is composed of uniformly white buttons.

tion between two images. If we are given a random image I_r and a viewing position N, we could apply the same rationale by considering I_r^{DAF} as the distorted version of I_r . However, we do not expect the visibility index threshold value that we specified in Section 6.2.3 to be applicable to random images. The reason is that the level of distortion does not uniquely correspond to how visible particular visual details are in the distorted image. To verify this, we extended the data collection process that we presented in Section 6.2.1 to a different kind of hybrid keypads that we call white keypads. An example button from such a keypad is depicted in Figure 10. As we can see, the shoulder-surfer's keypad of a white keypad is composed of all white buttons. In the small dataset that we collected, the visibility index values were consistent for a particular user, but they were considerably lower than the corresponding values that the same user reported in the original dataset. This means that even if a person perceives the digits on a hybrid keypad to be equally visible to the digits on a white keypad, the distortion in the white keypad is bigger and the visibility index has a lower value. This is something logical, because when the reference buttons are all white, a digit that is even slightly visible is considered a big distortion. Based on that, we conclude that the visibility index threshold value is not universal. We would also like to remind that the values of the DAF filter parameters depend on the task at hand. As a result, we may have to repeat the estimation process for a considerably different task. We conclude that the visibility algorithm could be used to assess the visibility of general images, but its parameters have to be appropriately tuned for the particular task at hand.

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