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Structure and complexity of ex post efficient random assignments
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
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A random assignment specifies the probability of an agent getting an object. We examine the structural and computational aspects of ex post efficiency of random assignments. ...
We first show that whereas an ex post efficient assignment can be computed easily, checking whether a given random assignment is ex post efficient is NP-complete. ...
Acknowledgments NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program. ...
arXiv:1409.6076v1
fatcat:mxrvzgfra5a4nkvm2xyzzanbz4
A Comment on the Averseness of Random Serial Dictatorship to Stochastic Dominance Efficiency
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
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Although it returns an ex post efficient assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (A new solution to the random assignment problem, J. Econ. ...
In this comment, we give a detailed argument that the RSD assignment is not SD-efficient if and only if an ex post assignment exists that is not SD-efficient. ...
Data61 is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program. ...
arXiv:1603.07392v2
fatcat:6v7k3v4bvzditlpvexdy6smsva
Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments
2003
Journal of Economic Theory
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Theory 19 (2002) 623) show that the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism may be stochastically dominated. ...
In this paper we investigate the relation between ex post efficiency and ordinal efficiency. ...
assignment: is an ex post efficient lottery. ...
doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00091-7
fatcat:gzsl3mbdgzdnxep6ppd6t5wxlq
Characterizing SW-Efficiency in the Social Choice Domain
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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Recently, Dogan, Dogan and Yildiz (2015) presented a new efficiency notion for the random assignment setting called SW (social welfare)-efficiency and characterized it. ...
In this note, we generalize the characterization for the more general domain of randomized social choice. ...
Acknowledgments NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program. ...
arXiv:1510.00460v1
fatcat:3rveqtrwoba75bb3irdap7ln6q
Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in the Random Assignment Setting with Indifferences
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
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We show that for this more general domain, there exists no extension of PS that is ex post efficient and weak strategyproof. ...
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. ...
Assume that there exists a random assignment p that is ex post efficient but not SD-efficient. ...
arXiv:1604.07540v1
fatcat:korrgxpwifeshcotouhs3vdxoa
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
[article]
2023
arXiv
pre-print
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2023 pre-print arXiv:2303.11976v1 fatcat:vdky46hx2va6tkx37rahlp4kemOther Versions
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of n agents with strict preferences over n houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness ...
By weakening ex post efficiency and strategyproofness, we reduce the question of whether RSD is characterized by these axioms for fixed n to determining whether a matrix has rank n^2 n!^n. ...
This variant merely requires that for each profile the support of the resulting random assignment coincides with that of some ex post efficient random assignment. ...
arXiv:2303.11976v3
fatcat:xlir3psmhbbpjbrq4dih3m5uie
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
2001
Journal of Economic Theory
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Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. ...
Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. ...
In their model, ordinal and ex post efficiency coincide.
EX POST, EX ANTE AND ORDINAL EFFICIENCY First we define the random assignment problem. ...
doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2710
fatcat:uixkhwicvre27eyes76pswo74a
Randomized Assignments for Barter Exchanges: Fairness vs. Efficiency
[chapter]
2015
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We study fairness and efficiency properties of randomized algorithms for barter exchanges with direct applications to kidney exchange problems. ...
However, in many applications, practical constraints often restrict the maximum allowed cyclelength of the exchange and for randomized algorithms, this imposes constraints of the cycle-length of every ...
An assignment is ex-post Pareto efficient if for every realization of randomness, there is no other assignment that Pareto dominates it. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_32
fatcat:rvwiwihkz5cczlzbttgdk4gpvu
Energy-Efficient Post-Processing Technique Having High Extraction Efficiency for True Random Number Generators
2021
IEICE transactions on electronics
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In this paper, we describe a post-processing technique having high extraction efficiency (ExE) for de-biasing and de-correlating a random bitstream generated by true random number generators (TRNGs). ...
The maximum ExE of VN 8W is 62.21%, which is 2.49 times larger than the ExE of the original von Neumann. ...
Post-processing techniques can be classified into two categories. The first category is the fixed extraction efficiency (hereinafter ExE) technique. ...
doi:10.1587/transele.2020cdp0006
fatcat:4fb2iupaprbp7hb2pwfexjycsm
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there are no strategyproof Condorcet extensions and that only random dictatorships satisfy ex post efficiency and strategyproofness ...
We relax Condorcet-consistency and ex post efficiency by introducing a lower bound on the probability of Condorcet winners and an upper bound on the probability of Pareto-dominated alternatives, respectively ...
-ex post Efficiency According to Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem, random dictatorships are the only strategyproof SDSs that satisfy ex post efficiency. ...
arXiv:2201.10418v1
fatcat:2etfz5nm7ncd7hxyaik4cbzjdm
Random assignment with multi-unit demands
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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For single-unit random assignment, we show that there exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and weak group-strategyproof. ...
The most well-established preference relation to compare random allocations of objects is stochastic dominance (SD) which also leads to corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and weak strategyproofness ...
of Aerospace Research and Development through grant AOARD-124056. ...
arXiv:1401.7700v3
fatcat:u7hcsohs2bfmzc4ysnkymmvarm
Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
2004
Journal of Mathematical Economics
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We show that the axioms equal treatment of equals and probabilistic consistency characterize the uniform rule, which is the rule which randomizes uniformly over all possible assignments. ...
This paper introduces a notion of consistency for the probabilistic assignment model, which we call probabilistic consistency. ...
N, X) ), say p is ex post efficient for (N, X, R) if its support consists only of assignments efficient for (N, X, R). ...
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.10.004
fatcat:chtsfqaroncvfi77cehi2csxae
A theory of school-choice lotteries
2015
Theoretical Economics
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This is in contrast to much of the existing literature, which has instead focused on ex post stability, meaning that assignments are deemed stable after students are assigned to schools. ...
Armed with this criterion for evaluating mechanisms, we show that one of the mechanisms that has attracted the most attention-deferred acceptance with random tie-breaking-is not ex ante stable and under ...
that random tiebreaking may entail an ex post efficiency loss. ...
doi:10.3982/te1558
fatcat:tqpjpw2pmzcfzg2qwmdp2iqbxy
Efficient lottery design
2016
Social Choice and Welfare
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There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. ...
As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. ...
However, the support of L contains Pareto inefficient assignment µ 2 . Thus L is not ex-post efficient. ...
doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8
fatcat:mg3fybxxdvhrbdvbtrslrdhkw4
On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences
2015
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
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We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. ...
We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable ...
A random matching is ex post efficient if it can be represented as a probability distribution over Pareto efficient deterministic matchings. ...
doi:10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744
fatcat:gz56kozpb5btzjnzzy7ly5hxe4
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