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Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing L_p Norm of Costs
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
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In our paper, we study the problem described above with the social cost function being the L_p norm of the vector of agent-costs. ...
This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. ...
For this definition of social cost, our goal now is to find a strategyproof mechanism that does well with respect to minimizing the social cost. ...
arXiv:1305.2446v2
fatcat:caufemj2z5envhhmyrsuojeumu
Characterization of Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
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We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. ...
A strictly convex space is a normed vector space where x+y<2 holds for any pair of different unit vectors x ≠ y, e.g., any L_p space with p∈ (1,∞). ...
They study approximately optimal strategyproof mechanisms for facility games under social cost (the sum of individual costs) and maximum cost (the maximum of individual costs) objectives while taking care ...
arXiv:1808.06320v3
fatcat:a5h25jxmyne2nl4xt5ynzwhyzm
The Effect of Strategic Noise in Linear Regression
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
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A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
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We focus on a broad class of non-strategyproof algorithms for linear regression, namely ℓ_p norm minimization (p > 1) with convex regularization. ...
We also shed light on the structure of this equilibrium by uncovering a surprising connection between strategyproof algorithms and pure Nash equilibria of non-strategyproof algorithms in a broader setting ...
i is the outcome of the mechanism minimizing q norm of residuals with honest reports. ...
arXiv:2007.07316v1
fatcat:enccy6kkd5ctfkqx6whng3tbja