Aug 10, 2016 · We show a fundamental result that, due to the non-excludable nature of security, there exists no reliable mechanism, which can incentivize ...

Abstract—In a network of interdependent users, the expendi- ture in security measures by an entity affects not only herself,.

[J7] Using Private and Public Assessments in Security Information ... [J3] Opting out of Incentive Mechanisms: A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good ...

Opting out of incentive mechanisms: A study of security as a non-excludable public good ... Provision of public goods on networks: on existence, uniqueness, and ...

Opting out of incentive mechanisms: A study of security as a non-excludable public good. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 11 (12) ...

Opting out of Incentive Mechanisms: A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good. (PDF), (online appendix). P. Naghizadeh, M. Liu. In IEEE Transactions ...

P. Naghizadeh and M. Liu, “Opting out of Incentive Mechanisms: A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good”, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics ...

Opting Out of Incentive Mechanisms: A Study of Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good ... In a network of interdependent users, the expenditure in security ...

Mar 25, 2015 · is what sets the study of incentive mechanisms for security games apart from ... concerning the provision of non-excludable public goods ...

This type of mechanism design turns out to be more challenging than in other resource allocation contexts because security is a non-excludable public good and ...