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Given three instances of RSA with a common modulus N and private exponents each smaller than N0:33, the attack can factor the modulus about 93% of the time in practice. The success rate of the attack can be increased up to almost 100% by including a relatively small exhaustive search.
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In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice than previously ...
Jul 8, 2010 · In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice ...
Jan 20, 2009 · Abstract. In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that. Guo's continued fraction attack works much ...
In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice than previously ...
PDF | In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice.
This work shows that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice than previously expected and re-examines two common modulus attacks on ...
Hinek, M. and Charles C. Y. Lam. “Common modulus attacks on small private exponent RSA and some fast variants (in practice)." J. Math. Cryptol ( ...
Bibliographic details on Common Modulus Attacks on Small Private Exponent RSA and Some Fast Variants (in Practice).